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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES

by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr 
BANkRuPTCy 
GENERAL

EXEMPTIONS

EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The Chapter 7 petition 
was	filed	on	May	5,	2005	and	 the	debtor	claimed	an	exemption	
for a portion of the 2005 federal earned income tax credit as 
public assistance under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 422.291 or as vocational 
rehabilitation maintenance under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 615.270. The 
court held that the earned income tax credit was not eligible for the 
public assistance exemption because the tax credit was not paid 
under a state assistance program. The court held that the earned 
income tax credit was not eligible for the vocational rehabilitation 
maintenance exemption because the tax credit was not paid under a 
state assistance program for a handicapped person. In re Thompson, 
336 B.R. 800 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005). 
FEDERAL TAX 
CHILD TAX CREDIT.	The	Chapter	7	debtors	filed	their	petition	
on	October	25,	2004.	In	2005,	the	debtors	filed	their	2004	income	
tax return and claimed a refund, including $69 from the child tax 
credit and $1,931 from the additional child tax credit. The child tax 
credit was a non-refundable credit for which a refund would arise 
only to the extent of any tax owed and the additional child tax credit 
was a refundable credit which would be refunded even if no tax was 
owed. The court held that the refundable additional child tax credit 
amount was property of the estate, to the extent of the portion of 
the	tax	year	after	the	bankruptcy	filing,	but	the	non-refundable	child	
tax credit was not property of the estate. In re Law, 336 B.R. 780 
(Bankr. 8th Cir. 2006), aff’g, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2628 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 2005). 
CONTRACTS 
BREACH. In the fall of 2000, the plaintiff was a sweet potato 
farmer who delivered an entire crop of sweet potatoes to the 
defendant who stored, packaged and sold the sweet potatoes to 
markets. The defendant stored the potatoes until the fall of 2001 
when the defendant determined that the entire crop was unmarketable 
and dumped the potatoes without prior notice to the plaintiff. In the 
past,	the	defendant	had	notified	the	plaintiff	of	any	problems	with	the	
potatoes and allowed the plaintiff to retrieve any potatoes determined 
to be unmarketable. The plaintiff claimed that the failure to provide 
notice was a breach of contract that failed to allow the plaintiff a 
chance to inspect the potatoes and take any action to mitigate the 
damages. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff and offset 
the damages by a portion of the amount of payment received by 
the plaintiff from the USDA under the Quality Loss Program. The 
defendant appealed the judgment, arguing that a jury instruction was 
improper in that it used regulations under the PerishableAgricultural 
Commodities Act to describe the standard of care required by the 
defendant	for	storing	the	potatoes.	The	appellate	court	affirmed	the	
use of the regulations as consistent with state law as to the duty of 
care	of	a	storage	facility.	The	court	also	affirmed	the	jury	verdict	as	
based	on	sufficient	evidence	of	an	oral	contract	between	the	parties	
that required the defendant to give notice of any problems with a 
stored crop before disposing of it. The plaintiff appealed the trial 
court’s offset of the USDApayment against the jury award. The court 
held that the USDA payment should not have been offset against 
the jury award because the USDA payment was compensation for 
loss of crop yield and the jury award was for the loss of the crop 
from improper disposal. Wilson v. Burch Farms, Inc., 2006 N.C. 
App. LEXIS 585 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
FEDERAL AGRICuLTuRAL 
PROGRAMS 
DIRECT AND COuNTER-CyCLICAL PROGRAM. The 
CCC	has	adopted	as	final	regulations	implementing	the	provisions	
of theAgricultural ReconciliationAct of 2005 regarding percentages 
used to determine payment amounts for producers electing to 
receive advance payments through the Direct and Counter-Cyclical 
Program. 71 Fed. Reg. 17982 (April 10, 2006). 
EGGS. On April 27, 1998, USDA prohibited the repackaging 
of eggs packed under USDA’s voluntary grading program until the 
Department could review its policies regarding the repackaging and 
dating	of	eggs.	The	AMS	has	adopted	as	final	regulations	amending	
the voluntary shell egg grading rules by providing that shell eggs 
must not have been previously shipped for retail sale in order to be 
officially	identified	with	a	USDA	consumer	grademark;	by	changing	
the	definition	of	the	term	eggs	of	current	production	from	30	days	
to 21 days, thereby making eggs that were laid more than 21 days 
before	the	date	of	packing	ineligible	to	be	officially	identified	with	a	
USDA	consumer	grademark;	and	by	adding	a	definition	for	the	term	
shipped for retail sale. 71 Fed. Reg. 20287 (April 19, 2006). 
MILk. The	CCC	has	adopted	as	final	regulations	amending	the	
regulations for the Milk Income Loss Contract Program as authorized 
by theAgriculture ReconciliationAct of 2005 to extend the program 
from October 1, 2005, to September 30, 2007. The regulations also 
decrease the percentage rate for the payment calculation and remove 
the transition rule required at the beginning of the program. 71 Fed. 
Reg. 19621 (April 17, 2006). 
SPECIALTy CROPBLOCk GRANT PROGRAM. TheAMS 
has issued proposed regulations to administer the Specialty Crop 
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Block Grant Program (SCBGP) to enhance the competitiveness 
of specialty crops. This proposed rule establishes eligibility and 
application requirements, the review and approval process, and 
grant administration procedures for the SCBGP. The SCBGP
would be implemented under section 101 of the Specialty Crops 
Competitiveness Act of 2004 (7 U.S.C. § 1621 note). 71 Fed. Reg. 
20353 (April 20, 2006). 
FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXATION 
TRuSTS.	The	taxpayer	created	two	trusts.	The	first	trust	was	for	
the	benefit	of	the	taxpayer’s	spouse	and	children.	The	second	trust	
was	for	the	benefit	of	the	taxpayer.	After	the	trusts	were	created,	
the	taxpayer	discovered	that	the	first	trust	erroneously	provided	
for distribution of trust principal on the taxpayer’s death to the 
second trust. The trust principle was supposed to be distributed to 
a family or marital trust. The taxpayer had the trust reformed by 
a state court and sought a ruling that the reformation would not 
have income, estate or gift tax consequences. The IRS agreed that 
the trust was properly reformed by the state court and ruled that 
the reformation would not cause recognition of income or gift tax 
or cuase the trust principle to be included in the taxpayer’s estate 
because	the	taxpayer	did	not	retain	any	interest	in	the	first	trust	
before or after the reformation of the trust. Ltr. Rul. 200615025, 
Dec. 19, 2005. 
VALuATION. The decedent’s estate included stock and 
farmland. The stock passed to several of the decedent’s heirs and 
the will provided that one heir could purchase any residual estate
stock. The heirs and decedent entered into a family settlement 
agreement which set the price for the sale of the shares to the 
heir. However, that heir had entered into an agreement with 
the corporation to sell the stock to the corporation at a higher 
price. The IRS argued that the stock should be valued for estate 
tax purposes at the higher price. The court held that the family 
settlement agreement controlled the value of the stock for estate tax 
purposes because (1) the agreement covered all of the decedent’s 
stock; (2) the agreement was enforceable against all heirs; (3) the 
agreement furthered a business purpose by minimizing the risk to 
the decedent of owning a minority interest in the corporation; (4) 
the agreement did not serve a testamentary purpose because the 
decedent received consideration; and (5) the agreement was made
at arm’s length. The decedent’s farmland was valued on the basis 
of expert testimony which supported the valuation on the estate 
tax return, which included 15 percent minority interest discounts 
on two parcels of land. A future issue of the Digest will publish 
an article by Neil Harl on this case. Estate of Amlie v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2006-76. 
The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned 99 percent of a 
limited partnership which operated a ranch in Texas. The taxpayer 
transferred minority limited partnership interests to their children
by gift. The court valued the partnership interests based on the asset 
values of partnership property and allowed a 33 percent discount 
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for the value of the gifts for the combined lack of marketability 
and lack of control and a 7.5 percent discount because the 
partnership interests were private interests. No discount was 
allowed for unrealized capital gains because a potential buyer 
could negotiate an I.R.C. § 754 election to adjust partnership 
basis for the unrealized gains. Temple v. united States, 2006-1 
u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,523 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 
ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME. The taxpayer was an 
independent insurance agent who had contracted with several 
insurance companies to sell their insurance in exchange for 
commissions. The taxpayer assigned the commissions to a family 
trust and the commissions were paid directly to the trust. The 
taxpayer did not include the commissions in income, arguing 
that the income was earned by the trust under the assignment. 
The court held that the taxpayer was personally liable for the 
income tax on the commissions because the commissions were 
paid under the agency contracts between the taxpayer and the 
insurance companies, the taxpayer provided the services which 
earned the commissions, and the commissions were paid based 
on the policies sold by the taxpayer. McManus v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo. 2006-68. 
BuSINESS DEDuCTIONS. The taxpayer was employed 
full time as a college physics professor. The taxpayer claimed 
to have operated several businesses out of the taxpayer’s home 
during	the	tax	years	in	question	and	filed	Schedule	C	for	each	
business, but included no income for the businesses, with business 
expense deductions. The taxpayer provided little written evidence 
to support the existence of the businesses and the court held that 
the taxpayer was not allowed deductions beyond those allowed 
by the IRS for lack of substantiation. kanofsky v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2006-79. 
CORPORATIONS 
EMPLOYEE. The taxpayer was a tax attorney and formed a 
C corporation to operate the law practice business. The taxpayer 
was the sole shareholder, president and secretary-treasurer. 
The taxpayer provided all of the services, which generated the 
corporation’s income, and managed all of the corporation’s 
business affairs. The court held that the compensation received by 
the taxpayer from the corporation was wages and any employment-
related expenses were miscellaneous itemized deductions and not 
eligible for a business deduction. The corporation was assessed 
penalties for failure to deposit employment taxes and for 
underpayment of tax for the wages paid to the sole shareholder, 
president, and secretary-treasurer of the corporation. The appellate 
court	affirmed	in	an	opinion	designated	as	not	for	publication.	
See In the News, infra. Western Management, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,267 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’g, 
T.C. Memo. 2003-162. 
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LOANS TO SHAREHOLDERS. The taxpayer corporation 
was owned by members of one family and operated a 
manufacturing business. The shareholders contributed money to 
the corporation, treated the contributions as loans at an above-
market interest rate, and received payments from the corporation 
for various personal uses. The court held that the contributions 
were capital investments and not loans, disallowing an 
interest deduction to the corporation for the payments to the 
shareholders. The court discussed the following factors in 
holding the contributions to be investments and not loans: 
(1) the shareholders received a return in excess of the market 
rate; (2) the shareholders and corporation were inconsistent 
in their characterization and treatment of the obligation of the 
corporation to repay the contributions and failed to enforce the 
terms of the “loans;” and (3) the terms of the contributions were 
not negotiated at arm’s-length. The court discussed several 
of the 11 factors used in Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r, 800 
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1986), for determining whether shareholder 
contributions were loans or investments—(1) the corporation 
did	not	declare	or	pay	dividends;	(2)	there	was	no	fixed	maturity	
date or enforceable obligation to repay the contributions; (3) 
payments	made	to	the	shareholders	came	from	corporate	profits;	
(4) no security was requested or given for the contributions; 
and (5) the corporation did not establish a sinking fund for 
repayment of the contributions. The court held that the above 
factors outweighed the corporation’s reporting of the payments 
as deductible interest and the shareholders’ reporting of the 
payments as interest income, the adequate capitalization of 
the corporation, and the fact that the contributions were not 
commensurate with the shareholder’s ownership share in the 
corporation. Indmar Products Co., Inc. v. Comm’r, 2006-1 
u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,270 (6th Cir. 2006), rev’g, T.C. 
Memo. 2005-32. 
COuRTAWARDSAND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer’s 
spouse was killed in an accident while the spouse was working. 
The taxpayer received workers’compensation but also sued the 
employer for negligence. The taxpayer received a jury award 
but agreed to a smaller amount in a settlement for punitive 
damages. Under Texas law, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 
§ 71.001 et seq., an injured employee could elect to receive 
workers’ compensation and sue for punitive damages or elect 
not to receive workers’compensation and sue for compensatory 
and punitive damages. Under I.R.C. § 104(c) punitive damages 
are excluded from taxable income only in wrongful death 
actions for which only punitive damages may be awarded. 
The court held that, because the taxpayer had the option to 
recover compensatory damages in the wrongful death lawsuit 
by rejecting any workers’ compensation, the state law did 
not restrict damages in the wrongful death action to punitive 
damages. Benavides v. united States, 2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) ¶ 50,263 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
The taxpayer was employed by a horse race track as an 
announcer. The taxpayer suffered from several medical 
conditions which were not caused by the employment but caused 
the taxpayer to be placed on disability leave several times. The 
taxpayer also suffered from a gambling addiction and received 
treatment. The taxpayer’s employer reduced the taxpayer’s salary 
and	 the	 taxpayer	filed	an	action	alleging	 that	 the	 reduction	was	
discriminatory because it was based on the taxpayer’s gambling 
addiction. The petition made no mention of any physical injuries 
suffered by the taxpayer from the salary reduction. The parties 
reached a settlement agreement for a lump sum payment and the 
settlement did not mention that any portion of the settlement was for 
physical injuries. The court held that the settlement was all included 
in taxable income because the settlement was compensation for lost 
wages and not physical injury. Bothe v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 
2006-51. 
CAPITAL LOSSES. The taxpayers attempted to claim more 
than $3,000 in net long-term capital losses. The taxpayers argued 
that the IRS refusal to allow more than $3,000 loss deduction 
amounted to taxation of the disallowed losses, in violation of the 
Sixteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal protection. 
The court held that the treatment of different kinds of income and 
loss is provided in several aspects of the Internal Revenue Code; 
therefore, no constitutional violation occurred from the limitation
on net long-term capital losses in any one tax year. Perry v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-77. 
DEPRECIATION. The IRS has announced an extension of the 
current December 31, 2005, placed-in-service date to December 31, 
2006, for bonus depreciation that applies to I.R.C. § 168(k)(2)(B)
property (which includes property with a long production period 
and transportation property) and I.R.C. § 168(k)(2)(C) property 
(which includes certain noncommercial aircraft) that is either 
placed in service by the taxpayer or manufactured by a person in 
the Katrina GO Zone, the Rita GO Zone or the Wilma GO Zone, 
provided the taxpayer was unable to meet the current placed-in-
service date deadline as a result of Hurricane Katrina, Rita or 
Wilma. To take advantage of this relief, the taxpayer must write 
“Extension under Announcement 2006-29” across the top of its 
Form 4562, Depreciation and Amortization, for the placed-in-
service year of the property. Ann. 2006-29, I.R.B. 2006-19. 
DISASTER LOSSES. OnApril 5, 2006, the president determined 
that certain areas in Missouri are eligible for assistance from the 
government under the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121) as a result of severe storms, tornadoes 
and	flooding,	which	began	on	March	30,	2005.	FEMA-1635-DR. 
On April 13, 2006, the president determined that certain areas in 
Oklahoma are eligible for assistance from the government under 
the Act as a result of a severe storms and tornadoes, which began on 
March 12, 2006. FEMA-1637-DR. OnApril 13, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in Kansas are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Act as a result of a severe storms 
and tornadoes, which began on March 12, 2006. FEMA-1638-DR. 
On March 28, 2006, the president determined that certain areas in 
Illinois are eligible for assistance from the government under the
Act as a result of a severe storms and tornadoes, which began on 
March 11, 2006. FEMA-1633-DR. On April 5, 2006, the president 
determined that certain areas in Tennessee are eligible for assistance 
from the government under the Act as a result of a severe storms 
and tornadoes, which began on April 2, 2006. FEMA-1634-DR. 
Taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to these disasters may 
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deduct the losses on their 2005 returns. 
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayers, 
husband and wife, owned all of an S corporation which became 
insolvent in 1992. A receiver was appointed and an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition was filed against the corporation. The 
corporation’s assets were collected and sold by the bankruptcy 
trustee and the bankruptcy case was closed in 1996. The taxpayers 
claimed that the S corporation received discharge of indebtedness 
income during 1992-1994 when several creditors wrote off 
corporation debts. The taxpayers argued that this discharge of 
indebtedness caused recognition of discharge of indebtedness 
income which increased their basis in the corporation stock and 
allowed them to deduct suspended losses from pre-bankruptcy 
tax years. The taxpayers did not provide any written evidence to 
support the timing of the discharge of indebtedness but merely 
claimed that the debts were discharged during the bankruptcy. 
The court held that, because the bankruptcy case was continuing 
throughout	1992-1994,	no	final	 identifiable	 event	occurred	 to	
cause the recognition of discharge of the indebtedness until the 
close of the case in 1996; therefore, the discharge of indebtedness 
did not occur until the bankruptcy case was closed. Alpert v. 
united States, 2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,262 (N.D. 
Ohio 2006). 
ENROLLED AGENTS. The IRS has announced that it 
expects a new computer-based version of the Special Enrollment 
Examination for enrolled agents to be delivered in October 
2006. The new exam will be developed and administered by 
a	 nationwide	 private	 testing	 firm	 called	Thomson	 Prometric.	
The new version will be approximately the same length as prior 
exams but will be broken into four parts. It will primarily consist 
of multiple choice questions with no true-or-false questions. IR-
2006-61. 
GIFT OR INCOME. The taxpayer discovered that the 
taxpayer’s spouse was having an affair with a doctor. The taxpayer 
threatened the doctor with a lawsuit. The doctor gave the taxpayer 
$25,000 and apologized for the affair. The IRS assessed the 
taxpayer	a	deficiency	for	failing	to	report	the	money	as	income	
and the taxpayer argued that the money was a gift because it 
was paid voluntarily. The court held that the money was taxable 
income and not a gift because the doctor paid the money in order 
to settle the matter and avoid a law suit. Peebles v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Summary Op. 2006-61. 
FuEL CREDIT. The IRS has announced that the reference 
price that is to be used in determining the availability of the I.R.C. 
§ 29 tax credit for the production of fuel from nonconventional 
sources for calendar year 2005 is $50.26. Since this amount does 
not	exceed	$23.50	multiplied	by	the	inflation	adjustment	factor	
(2.2640), the I.R.C. § 29(b)(1) phaseout of the credit will not 
occur	for	any	qualified	fuel	based	on	the	above	reference	price.	
The nonconventional source fuel credit for 2005 is $6.79 per 
barrel-of-oil	equivalent	of	qualified	fuels. 
HyBRID VEHICLE TAX CREDIT. Effective for vehicles 
placed in service after December 31, 2005, an alternative motor 
vehicle	credit	is	allowed	which	is	the	sum	of	(1)	qualified	fuel	cell	 
motor vehicle credit, (2) advanced lean burn technology motor 
vehicle	credit,	(3)	qualified	hybrid	motor	vehicle	credit,	and	(4)	
qualified	alternative	fuel	motor	vehicle	credit.	I.R.C.	§	30B(a).	
The credits allowed cannot exceed the regular tax reduced 
by other credits over the tentative minimum tax for the year. 
I.R.C. § 30B(g)(2). The credits are treated as a general business 
credit if the vehicle is subject to an allowance for depreciation. 
I.R.C. § 30B(g)(1). The IRS has announced the hybrid vehicle 
certifications	and	the	credit	amounts	for	several	vehicles: 
Year and Model Credit Amount 
2005 Toyoto Prius $3,150
2006 Toyoto Prius $3,150
2006 Toyoto Highlander 4WD $2,600
2006 Toyoto Highlander 2WD $2,600
2006 Lexus RX400h 2WD $2,200
2006 Lexus RX400h 4WD $2,200
2006 Ford Escape 4WD $1,950
2006 Ford Escape 2WD $2,600
2006 Mercury Mariner 4WD $1,950
See Harl, “Additional Items in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
16 Agric. L. Dig. 131 (2005). IR-2006-56, IR-2006-57. 
PASSIVEACTIVITy LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and 
wife, resided in Massachusetts and owned two vacation rental 
properties in Florida. Both taxpayers were employed full time 
in Massachusetts. The taxpayers claimed losses of $71,000 
for the rental properties, which were disallowed by the IRS as 
passive activity losses. The taxpayers attempted to demonstrate 
that	they	spent	sufficient	time	on	the	rental	activity	to	qualify	
as real estate professionals by supplying a summary of their 
activities constructed for their court challenge. The court held 
that	the	activity	summary	was	insufficient	to	prove	the	amount	
of time spent on the rental activity because it was a “ballpark 
guesstimate” and not a contemporaneous record of all activities. 
The taxpayers were not eligible for the $25,000 deduction for 
passive rental losses because the taxpayers’ adjusted gross 
income exceeded $150,000 by more than $25,000. Hanna v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-57. 
PENSION PLANS. The taxpayer had been employed by the 
U.S. Postal Service and had contributed to a pension plan with 
the USPS. Before the taxpayer terminated employment because 
of a disability, the taxpayer had borrowed twice from the pension 
plan. After the taxpayer’s employment was terminated, the plan 
administrator	notified	the	taxpayer	that	the	loans	had	to	be	repaid	
or the loan amounts would be deemed to be distributions. The 
loans were not repaid and the plan issued Form 1099-R listing 
the distributions. The taxpayer did not contribute any funds to 
a new IRA after retirement and did not include the distribution 
amounts in taxable income. The court held that the deemed 
distributions were taxable income to the taxpayer. Royal v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-72. 
In 2003 the taxpayer was placed on leave of absence from 
employment due to acute depression. In December 2003, the 
taxpayer received a distribution from a pension plan. The 
taxpayer included the distribution in taxable income on the 2003 
tax return but did not pay the 10 percent additional tax for an 
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early withdrawal. In January 2004, the taxpayer was examined 
by a psychiatrist who reported to the taxpayer’s employer that 
the taxpayer could return to work. The taxpayer argued that 
the distribution was eligible for the disability exception under 
I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(3)(A)(iii). The court held that the taxpayer was 
not eligible for the exception because the taxpayer’s disability 
was	not	“of	long-continued	and	indefinite	duration.”	Johnson 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2006-62. 
The taxpayer had a 401(k) pension plan with a former employer 
and decided to obtain a college degree to pursue a teaching career. 
The taxpayer received a distribution from the plan and used 
the funds to pay off existing education loans, current education 
expenses and expenses in subsequent tax years. The taxpayer 
included the distribution in taxable income but did not pay the 
10 percent additional tax, arguing that the educational expense 
exception listed in the Master Tax Guide (CCH) applied. Note: 
the quoted discussion from the Master Tax Guide does state 
that the exception applied only to IRAs. The court held that 
the exception allowed in I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(E) applied only to 
individual retirement plans and not to distributions from 401(k) 
plans; therefore, the distribution was subject to the 10 percent 
penalty for early withdrawal. Domanico v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Summary Op. 2006-55. 
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES 
May 2006
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term 
AFR 4.85 4.79 4.76 4.74 
110 percent AFR 5.34 5.27 5.24 5.21 
120 percent AFR 5.83 5.75 5.71 5.68 
Mid-term 
AFR 4.84 4.78 4.75 4.73 
110 percent AFR 5.33 5.26 5.23 5.20 
120 percent AFR 5.82 5.74 5.70 5.67 
Long-term
AFR 5.00 4.94 4.91 4.89 
110 percent AFR 5.50 5.43 5.39 5.37 
120 percent AFR 6.02 5.93 5.89 5.86 
Rev. Rul. 2006-24, I.R.B. 2006-19. 
SALE OF RESIDENCE.	The	taxpayer	was	a	police	officer	
who had made a highly-publicized arrest of a drug dealer. The 
taxpayer learned that associates of the drug dealer knew the 
taxpayer’s address and planned to kill the taxpayer. The taxpayer 
decided to move and requested a ruling that the taxpayer was 
eligible to exclude gain from the sale of the house, even though 
the taxpayer had owned the house for less than two years. The 
IRS ruled that the sale of the taxpayer’s house was the result of 
unforeseen circumstances and allowed the exclusion of gain on 
the sale of the taxpayer’s house based on the maximum dollar 
limitation multiplied by a fraction equal to the number of days 
lived in the house divided by 730. Ltr. Rul. 200615011, Dec. 8, 
2005. 
S CORPORATIONS 
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayers were each 50 percent 
shareholders in an S corporation and 50 percent partners in a 
partnership. The partnership made loans to the S corporation either 
directly or through loans to the taxpayers who loaned the funds to 
the S corporation. The court held that the loans made directly from 
the partnership to the corporation did not increase the taxpayers’
basis in the corporation because the taxpayers failed to prove that 
they were personally liable for the loans. Ruckriegel v. Comm’r, 
T.C. Memo. 2006-78. 
TRuSTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, established several 
tiered business trust entities and transferred their personal and real 
property to the trusts, as well as assigning all personal income to 
the trusts. The trusts were set up using a tax avoidance scheme sold 
by another company. The entities were carefully operated with all 
business formalities and even generated income from selling the 
same tax schemes to other persons. The court held that the trusts 
and business entities were shams without economic substance 
because the taxpayers continued to control all the assets and 
personally earned all the income; therefore, the taxpayers were 
personally liable for the income tax on the income. Richardson 
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2006-69. 
	 The	taxpayer	formed	a	trust	and	served	as	trustee.	A	deficiency	
was	assessed	against	the	taxpayer	and	the	taxpayer	filed	a	petition	
in the Tax Court on behalf of the trust. The IRS moved to dismiss 
the	 petition	 because	 the	 deficiency	 was	 assessed	 against	 the	
taxpayer individually and not against the trust. The case was 
dismissed	and	the	taxpayer	filed	an	appeal,	again	on	behalf	of	the	
trust. The appellate court advised the taxpayer that only licensed
attorneys may represent a trust before the court but the taxpayer
refused to hire an attorney. The court dismissed the appeal because 
the trust was not represented by licensed counsel. Van de Berg 
v. Comm’r, 2006-1 u.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,275 (3d Cir. 
2006). 
PRODuCT LIABILITy 
FERTILIZER. The plaintiff produced a “weed and feed” 
product for use on home lawns. The fertilizer portion of the product 
contained phosphorus which can cause excessive growth of algae 
in lakes which receive runoff from areas on which the fertilizer is 
applied. The defendants city and county enacted ordinances which 
prohibited the application of phosphorus. The city and county had 
over 100 lakes. Although the plaintiff reconstituted its product to 
omit	the	phosphorus,	the	plaintiff	filed	suit	to	have	the	ordinances	
declared invalid under state and federal law. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the plaintiff 
appealed on the sole issue that the ordinances were preempted
by state law, Wis. Stat. § 94.701(3)(a), which prohibits cities and 
counties from regulating pesticides. The plaintiff pointed to Wis. 
Stat.	§	94.67(25)	which	defined	pesticide	so	as	to	include	products	
which mixed pesticides with fertilizers. However, Wis. Stat. § 
94.64(1)(e)	defined	fertilizer	so	as	to	include	products	which	mixed	
fertilizers with pesticides. The court noted that these overlapping 
definitions	 were	 intended	 to	 prevent	 pesticide	 manufacturers	 
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from escaping from state regulation by including fertilizer in their 
pesticide products and to prevent fertilizer manufacturers from 
escaping city and county regulation by including pesticides in their 
fertilizer	products.	The	court	held	that	the	overlapping	definition	
still prevented cities and counties from regulating the pesticide 
content of products yet allowed cities and counties to regulate 
the fertilizer content of products. Because the defendant city 
and county ordinances regulated only the fertilizer content of the 
plaintiff’s product, the regulation was not prohibited by the state 
law governing pesticides. The court noted that the plaintiff had 
no	difficulty	in	reconstituting	its	product	to	omit	the	phosphorus.	
CroplifeAmerica, Inc. v. City of Madison, 432 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 
2006), aff’g, 2005 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 12648 (W.D. Wis. 2005). 
PROPERTy 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. The plaintiff purchased 20 
acres to add to the plaintiff’s nursery crop land. The new acres 
had no direct road access but a railroad track ran along a portion 
of the land and a private crossing over the tracks allowed access 
to the land. The defendant owned the right-of-way and sought an 
agreement from the plaintiff that the plaintiff would indemnify the 
defendant for any liability claims for the crossing and asked the 
plaintiff to contribute to the costs of maintenance of the crossing. 
When the plaintiff refused both requests, the defendant had the 
crossing removed, although the defendant offered the use of a 
portion of the easement for an access road. The access road was 
not	sufficiently	wide	for	the	plaintiff’s	delivery	trucks.	The	plaintiff	
claimed that it had a prescriptive easement over the crossing and 
claimed that the removal of the crossing was tortious interference 
with the plaintiff’s business operations. The trial court agreed with 
the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to restore the crossing. The 
appellate court reversed, holding that it was well-settled law that a 
private individual could not acquire a prescriptive easement over a 
public highway, which included working rail tracks. The plaintiff 
attempted to argue that a prescriptive easement was allowed to the 
extent of allowing a use which did not disturb the defendant’s use 
of the right-of-way, but the court refused to provide a use exception 
to the general rule. Although a motion for rehearing was denied, 
the appellate court issued a revised opinion. Mississippi Export 
Railroad Co. v. Rouse, 2006 Miss. LEXIS 190 (Miss. 2006), 
substituted for, 2005 Miss. LEXIS 808 (Miss. 2005). 
WATER 
GROuND WATER. The plaintiffs were pecan farmers whose 
land neighbored the defendant’s manufacturing facility. The 
defendant wanted to expand its facility and obtained a state permit 
to pump 2.07 acre-feet of groundwater from the construction 
site into an on-site retention basin for drainage back into the 
underground aquifer. Defendant violated the permit and pumped 
an additional 122 acre-feet of water which dropped the water table 
beneath the plaintiff’s property by 16 feet. The loss of water under 
the plaintiffs’orchards caused the loss of the plaintiffs’pecan trees. 
The trial court awarded $1.2 million to the plaintiff, based on a 
ruling that the defendant’s use of the water was unreasonable. 
The appellate court reversed, holding that, under Arizona law, the 
defendant did not violate the common law doctrine of reasonable 
use, because Arizona law does not require withdrawn water to 
be used or even used on the land, but only requires the water be 
extracted	for	the	beneficial	use	of	the	land	from	which	the	water	 
is pumped. Brady v. Abbott Laboratories, 433 F.3d 679 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
IN THE NEWS 
The U.S. Supreme Court has amended the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure to provide that 
“(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict 
the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or 
other written dispositions that have been: 
(i) designated as “unpublished,” “not for publication,” “non-
precedential, “ “not precedent,” or the like; and 
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007. 
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, 
order, judgment, or other written disposition that is not available 
in	a	publicly	accessible	electronic	database,	the	party	must	file	
and serve a copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or disposition 
with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.” 
Fed. Rules App. Proc. 32.1 (amended April 12, 2006). 
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